Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

24 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2010

See all articles by Vjollca Sadiraj

Vjollca Sadiraj

Georgia State University - Department of Economics

Jan Tuinstra

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE); Tinbergen Institute

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: April 2010

Abstract

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

Keywords: spatial voting models, electoral competition, winning set, interest groups

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Sadiraj, Vjollca and Tuinstra, Jan and Van Winden, F. A. A. M., Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger (April 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1590164 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1590164

Vjollca Sadiraj

Georgia State University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States

Jan Tuinstra

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

F. A. A. M. Van Winden (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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