Trust, Verify or Incentivize? Effectuating Public International Law Regulating Public Goods Through Market Mechanisms

Published in: 104th Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 2011, pp. 153 - 156.

U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-08

7 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2010 Last revised: 16 Jul 2014

See all articles by Anne van Aaken

Anne van Aaken

University of Hamburg, Law School; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: April 1, 2010

Abstract

Traditionally, the enforcement of public international law (PIL) was a task of states: its addressees and its enforcers were states. That has changed recently. Whereas the influence of private market actors on the making of PIL has been extensively analyzed, their influence on its enforcement has been neglected, although the idea of using private interests in order to foster social goals has a long history. This article draws on theoretical insights of a rational-choice approach to PIL in order to analyze the prerequisites of effectuating PIL through private-market-actor incentives and market mechanisms, with a special view to International Public Goods and Commons.

Keywords: Public International Law, Public Goods

JEL Classification: K33, F55, F59

Suggested Citation

van Aaken, Anne, Trust, Verify or Incentivize? Effectuating Public International Law Regulating Public Goods Through Market Mechanisms (April 1, 2010). Published in: 104th Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 2011, pp. 153 - 156.; U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-08. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1591404 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1591404

Anne Van Aaken (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg, Law School ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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