Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization

Stanford Law School, Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 162 (also, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics Working Paper No. 366)

27 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 1999

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: March 1999

Abstract

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

JEL Classification: K4

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno, Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization (March 1999). Stanford Law School, Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 162 (also, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics Working Paper No. 366). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=159219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159219

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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