Clinical Practice Guidelines - The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Healthcare System

34 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2010 Last revised: 27 Apr 2011

See all articles by Ronen Avraham

Ronen Avraham

Tel Aviv University - Tel Aviv University, Buchmann Faculty of Law; University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Date Written: April 25, 2010

Abstract

The healthcare system is sick. The players are incentivized to maximize their own benefit and externalize their costs onto the other parties. This paper examines the warped incentives that underlie the system. The Tort system, lacking expertise and slow to adapt, is unable to overcome lack of expertise and cognitive biases to adequately solve the problems. Clinical Practice Guidelines could pose a solution, but not as they are currently developed. Guidelines promulgated by healthcare associations are infected by a web of conflicts of interest with every player in the industry. Government agencies, and their revolving doors, are underfunded and also subject to the industry’s web of conflicts. Even if adequate guidelines could consistently be produced, state legislatures and courts have been unwilling and unable to substantially incorporate guidelines into the legal landscape. Lastly, this article sketches a “private regulation” regime that could be a solution which would align all of the players’ incentives to society’s interests.

Suggested Citation

Avraham, Ronen, Clinical Practice Guidelines - The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Healthcare System (April 25, 2010). American Journal of Law and Medicine, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2011; U of Texas Law Public Law Research Paper No. 170; U of Texas Law Law and Econ Research Paper No. 181. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1593133

Ronen Avraham (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Tel Aviv University, Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Tel Aviv
Israel

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )

727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
(512) 232-1357 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/profile.php?id=ra22397

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