Political Entrepreneurship and the Formation of Special Districts

29 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2010 Last revised: 22 Dec 2010

See all articles by Alexander Fink

Alexander Fink

University of Leipzig

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 14, 2010

Abstract

Where general purpose governments provide a bundle of services within their boundaries, special district governments provide specific services inside the boundaries of general purpose governments. The alternative to forming a special purpose government is providing the service within a general purpose government. Formation of a special district represents the establishment of a new political enterprise, in contrast to the addition of a new product line to an existing government. We explore the formation of special districts as a particular form of the universal entrepreneurial search for gain or profit from exchange. Political entrepreneurship, like market entrepreneurship, operates inside some framework of rules, and the formation of special districts reflects the search for political gain within that framework of rules. We use an entrepreneurial framework to formulate several hypotheses concerning the formation and organization of special districts.

Keywords: special districts, political entrepreneurship, public enterprise, public-private interaction, enterprise-based public finance, constitutional political economy

JEL Classification: D72, H11, H71, L32

Suggested Citation

Fink, Alexander and Wagner, Richard E., Political Entrepreneurship and the Formation of Special Districts (December 14, 2010). European Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1593217

Alexander Fink (Contact Author)

University of Leipzig ( email )

Grimmaische Str. 12
Leipzig, 04109

HOME PAGE: http://www.alexander-fink.com

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
334 Enterprise Hall
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
(703) 993-1132 (Phone)

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