Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort

Posted: 26 Apr 2010

See all articles by Luciana Echazu

Luciana Echazu

Clarkson University

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: spring 2010

Abstract

We consider the distortions that corruption generates in law enforcement. Corruption dilutes deterrence, and hence the government needs to adjust law enforcement activities appropriately. We argue that this distortion is not the only one taking place. A misalignment of goals between the government and the enforcers results in another set of agency costs by which activities that put enforcers in direct contact with criminals increase at the cost of other law enforcement activities. The paper discusses the implications of both distortions.

Keywords: K4

Suggested Citation

Echazu, Luciana and Garoupa, Nuno, Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort (spring 2010). American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 162-180, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1593917 or http://dx.doi.org/ahp020

Luciana Echazu

Clarkson University ( email )

Potsdam, NY 13699-5780
United States
315-268-6456 (Phone)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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