The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements

Posted: 26 Apr 2010  

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Sungjoon Cho

Chicago Kent College of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: spring 2010

Abstract

This paper extends the economic literature on settlement and draws some practical insights on reverse payment settlements. The key contributions follow from the distinction drawn between standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, w and under which reverse settlements will be observed among injunctive settlements. Reverse settlements are likely when the stakes associated with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation costs. The analysis has broader implications for efficient remedies and legal rules. (JEL K10, K40, K41, D24, O34)

Keywords: K10, K40, K41, D24, O34

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N. and Cho, Sungjoon, The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements (spring 2010). American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 181-203, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1593918 or http://dx.doi.org/ahp026

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

Sungjoon Cho

Chicago Kent College of Law ( email )

565 W. Adams St.
Chicago, IL 60661-3691
United States

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