Posted: 26 Apr 2010
Date Written: spring 2010
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members that in turn increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.
Keywords: H11, K40, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
van Aaken, Anne and Feld, Lars P. and Voigt, Stefan, Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation Across Seventy-Eight Countries (spring 2010). American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 204-244, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1593920 or http://dx.doi.org/ahq002