Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1593920
 


 



Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation Across Seventy-Eight Countries


Anne van Aaken


University of St. Gallen - Law Department; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Lars P. Feld


Walter Eucken Institute; University of Freiburg - College of Economics and Behavioral Sciences; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stefan Voigt


University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

spring 2010

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 204-244, 2010

Abstract:     
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members that in turn increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.

Keywords: H11, K40, K42


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Date posted: April 26, 2010  

Suggested Citation

van Aaken, Anne and Feld, Lars P. and Voigt, Stefan, Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation Across Seventy-Eight Countries (spring 2010). American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 204-244, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1593920 or http://dx.doi.org/ahq002

Contact Information

Anne Van Aaken (Contact Author)
University of St. Gallen - Law Department ( email )
Guisanstrasse 36
St. Gallen, CH-9010
Switzerland
HOME PAGE: http://www.unisg.ch/en/Schools/Law/Ueber+LS/Lehrstuehle/Lehrstuhl+van+Aaken/Professorin.aspx
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Lars P. Feld
Walter Eucken Institute ( email )
Goethestrasse 10
Freiburg im Breisgau, Baden-Württemberg D-79100
Germany
University of Freiburg - College of Economics and Behavioral Sciences ( email )
Freiburg, D-79085
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Stefan Voigt
University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )
Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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