Credit within the Firm

47 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2010 Last revised: 7 Jul 2022

See all articles by Luigi Pistaferri

Luigi Pistaferri

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Stanford University

Luigi Guiso

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance

Fabiano Schivardi

Luiss Guido Carli - Department of Economics and Finance; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2010

Abstract

We exploit time variation in the degree of development of local credit markets and matched employer-employee data to assess the role of the firm as an internal credit market. In less developed local credit markets firms can offer a flatter wage-tenure profile than firms in more developed credit markets to lend implicitly to their workers or offer a steeper profile to implicitly borrow from their workers. We find that firms located in less financially developed markets offer wages that are lower at the beginning of tenure and grow faster than those offered by firms in more financially developed markets, helping firms finance their operations by raising funds from workers. Because we control for local market effects and only exploit time variation in the degree of local financial development induced by an exogenous liberalization, the effect we find is unlikely to reflect unobserved local factors that systematically affect wage tenure profiles. The size of implicit loans is larger for firms with more problematic access to bank credit and workers less likely to face credit constraints. The amount of credit generated by implicit lending within the firm is economically important and can be as large as 30% of bank lending. Consistent with credit market imperfections opening up trade opportunities within the firm, we find that the internal rate of return of implicit loans lies between the rate at which workers savings are remunerated in the market and the rate firms pay on their loans from banks.

Suggested Citation

Pistaferri, Luigi and Pistaferri, Luigi and Guiso, Luigi and Guiso, Luigi and Schivardi, Fabiano, Credit within the Firm (April 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w15924, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1594558

Luigi Pistaferri (Contact Author)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Luigi Guiso

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Sallustiana 62
Rome, 00187
Italy
+39 06 4792 4858 (Phone)
+39 06 4792 4872 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.eief.it/faculty-visitors/faculty-a-z/luigi-guiso/

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Sallustiana 62
rome, 00187
Italy

Fabiano Schivardi

Luiss Guido Carli - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Rome 00187
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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