Review of Financial Studies 27, 4, 2014, 957-989
47 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2010 Last revised: 22 Aug 2017
Date Written: September 15, 2010
The recent financial crisis has shown that short-term collateralized borrowing may be highly unstable in times of stress. The present paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model and shows that this instability can be a consequence of market-wide changes in expectations, but does not have to be. We derive a liquidity constraint and a collateral constraint that determine whether such expectations-driven runs are possible and show that they depend crucially on the microstructure of particular funding markets that we examine in detail. In particular, our model provides insights into the differences between the tri-party repo market and the bilateral repo market, which were both at the heart of the recent financial crisis.
Keywords: Investment banking, securities dealers, repurchase agreements, tri-party repo, bilateral repo, money market mutual funds, asset-backed commercial paper, runs, financial fragility
JEL Classification: E44, E58, G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Martin, Antoine and Skeie, David R. and von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, Repo Runs (September 15, 2010). Review of Financial Studies 27, 4, 2014, 957-989; FRB of New York Staff Report No. 444. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1594895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1594895