How Well do Measures of Ability Predict Judicial Performance?: A Case Study Using Securities Class Actions

64 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2010 Last revised: 18 Aug 2011

See all articles by Stephen J. Choi

Stephen J. Choi

New York University School of Law

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: August 16, 2011

Abstract

Diverse measures are used as proxies for judicial ability, ranging from the college and law school a judge attended to the rate at which her decisions are cited by other judges. Yet, there has been little serious examination of which of these ability measures is better or worse at predicting the quality of judicial performance - including the management and disposition of cases. In this article, we attempt to evaluate these measures of ability by examining a rich group of performance indicators. Our innovation is to derive performance measures from judicial decisions other than case outcomes (which are inherently difficult to evaluate): the decisions to preside over a securities class action, to reject a motion for lead plaintiff, to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, and to reject a request for fees. In each case, an affirmative decision requires more work from the judge, and thus may be an indicator that the judge works hard and, all else equal, performs well. Using a database of securities class action cases, we find that judges who publish frequently and are highly cited are more likely to dismiss with prejudice but no more likely to make the hard choice in the other cases. Other proxies for judicial ability (attended top law school, judicial experience, earlier position as judge, prior private practice, heavy business caseload, and senior status) are more mixed.

Keywords: Securities Class Actions, Judicial Ability, Litigation, Judges

JEL Classification: K22, K41

Suggested Citation

Choi, Stephen J. and Gulati, Mitu and Posner, Eric A., How Well do Measures of Ability Predict Judicial Performance?: A Case Study Using Securities Class Actions (August 16, 2011). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 519, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-18, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1596910 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1596910

Stephen J. Choi

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/y6mrqu

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

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