Doves and Hawks in Economics Revisited: An Evolutionary Quantum Game Theory-Based Analysis of Financial Crises

17 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2010

See all articles by Jennifer Kunz

Jennifer Kunz

Goethe University Frankfurt

Steffen Bernius

Goethe University Frankfurt

Wolfgang Koenig

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Matthias Hanauske

Institute of Information Systems, Goethe University Frankfurt

Date Written: April 29, 2010

Abstract

The last financial and economic crisis demonstrated the dysfunctional long-term effects of aggressive behaviour in financial markets. Yet, evolutionary game theory predicts that under the condition of strategic dependence a certain degree of aggressive behaviour remains within a given population of agents. However, as the consequences of the financial crisis exhibit, it would be desirable to change the ''rules of the game'' in a way that prevents the occurrence of any aggressive behaviour and thereby also the danger of market crashes. The paper picks up this aspect. Through the extension of the in literature well-known Hawk-Dove game by a quantum approach, we can show that dependent on entanglement, also evolutionary stable strategies can emerge, which are not predicted by classical evolutionary game theory and where the total economic population uses a non-aggressive quantum strategy.

Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Quantum Game Theory

JEL Classification: C7

Suggested Citation

Kunz, Jennifer and Bernius, Steffen and Koenig, Wolfgang and Hanauske, Matthias, Doves and Hawks in Economics Revisited: An Evolutionary Quantum Game Theory-Based Analysis of Financial Crises (April 29, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1597735 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1597735

Jennifer Kunz

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Steffen Bernius

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Wolfgang Koenig

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Matthias Hanauske (Contact Author)

Institute of Information Systems, Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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