Institutional Communication Revisited: Preferences, Opportunity Structures and Scientific Expertise in Policy Networks

29 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2010 Last revised: 9 Jun 2010

Philip Leifeld

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Volker Schneider

University of Konstanz

Date Written: April 26, 2010

Abstract

Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to preference similarity, influence reputation, social trust and institutional actor roles. We suggest that political opportunity structures and transaction costs play another crucial role and estimate a rich statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic chemicals policy domain. The results indicate that the effect of preference similarity is absorbed by other determinants while opportunity structures indeed have to be taken into account. We also find that different types of information exchange operate in complementary, but not necessarily congruent, ways.

Suggested Citation

Leifeld, Philip and Schneider, Volker, Institutional Communication Revisited: Preferences, Opportunity Structures and Scientific Expertise in Policy Networks (April 26, 2010). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2010/12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1598196 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1598196

Philip Leifeld (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Volker Schneider

University of Konstanz ( email )

Universitaetstrasse 10
Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

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