Rules for Aggregating Information

Posted: 19 May 2010 Last revised: 14 Feb 2011

See all articles by Christopher P. Chambers

Christopher P. Chambers

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Alan D. Miller

Faculty of Law, Western University

Date Written: May 1, 2010

Abstract

We present a model of information aggregation in which agents’ information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-specified set of individuals.

Keywords: Information, Aggregation, Separability, Partitions, Oligarchy

JEL Classification: D70, D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Chambers, Christopher P. and Miller, Alan D., Rules for Aggregating Information (May 1, 2010). Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 36, pp. 75-82, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1598807

Christopher P. Chambers

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Alan D. Miller (Contact Author)

Faculty of Law, Western University ( email )

1151 Richmond Street
London, Ontario N6A3K7
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://alandmiller.com

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