Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions

Posted: 4 Jun 2010

See all articles by Michael R. Roberts

Michael R. Roberts

The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Amir Sufi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; NBER

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

We review recent evidence and future directions for empirical research on financial contracting in the context of corporate finance. Specifically, we survey evidence pertaining to incentive conflicts, control rights, collateral, renegotiation, and interactions between financial contracts and other governance mechanisms. We also discuss directions for future research, concluding that the financial contracting approach offers a potentially fruitful perspective for empirical researchers seeking to better understand a variety of issues in corporate finance including capital structure, investment policy, payout policy, and corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

Roberts, Michael R. and Sufi, Amir, Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions (December 2009). Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 1, pp. 207-226, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1599433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-071808-145241

Michael R. Roberts (Contact Author)

The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

3620 Locust Walk, #2320
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
(215) 573-9780 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/

Amir Sufi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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