The Political Economy of Prosecution

Posted: 4 Jun 2010

See all articles by Sanford C. Gordon

Sanford C. Gordon

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Gregory Huber

Yale University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

Contemporary advances in the field of political economy, particularly those concerning the subject of delegated authority, can provide a unifying framework for analyzing the behavior and political context of criminal prosecutors in the United States. This perspective, which focuses on the extent of conflict between an official's motives and those of other actors, and the degree to which information is unevenly distributed among those actors, is well suited for studying prosecutors — the vast majority of whom are elected but whose accountability is frequently called into question. We apply this perspective to three areas in the existing literature on prosecutors: plea bargaining, courtroom communities, and public corruption prosecution.

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Sanford C. and Huber, Gregory, The Political Economy of Prosecution (December 2009). Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 5, pp. 135-156, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1599986 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131458

Sanford C. Gordon (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

19 West 4th Street, 2nd Floor
New York, NY 10012
United States

Gregory Huber

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
492
PlumX Metrics