The Senatorial Courtesy Game: Explaining the Norm of Informal Vetoes in ‘Advice and Consent’ Nominations
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 193-217, 2005
26 Pages Posted: 4 May 2010
Date Written: May 4, 2010
Abstract
Despite the contentiousness of advice and consent nominations, the Senate usually rejects a candidate to whom a home senator objects. Using game theory, this article explains the persistence of senatorial courtesy and maps its effects on which candidates succeed. The greater salience of a home nomination allows retaliation and reciprocity in a repeated game to elicit support for a veto, even under adverse conditions. Comparative statics indicate the range of the president’s feasible nominees and show which players gain and lose from the practice. Most notably, the president can benefit from an exercise of senatorial courtesy.
Keywords: Senatorial Courtesy, Norms, Vetoes, Judicial Nominations, President, Senate, Confirmation
JEL Classification: D72, K40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
By Randall Calvert, Mathew D. Mccubbins, ...
-
Politics and the Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make the Law
-
By Justin Fox and Stuart V. Jordan
-
Accountability and Independence: Administrative Law Judges and NLBR Rulings
By Cole Taratoot and Robert M. Howard
-
Beyond Treaties and Regulation: Using Market Forces to Control Dual Use Technologies