Corruption, Growth, and Governance: Private vs. State-Owned Firms in Vietnam

43 Pages Posted: 8 May 2010

See all articles by Thuy Thu Nguyen

Thuy Thu Nguyen

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management, Department of Finance; Business Administration Faculty, Foreign Trade University

Mathijs A. Van Dijk

Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

Date Written: May 4, 2010

Abstract

We provide a firm-level analysis of the relation between corruption and growth for private firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam. We obtain three different measures of the perceived corruption severity from a 2005 survey among 741 private firms and 133 SOEs. Our analysis shows that corruption hampers the growth of Vietnam’s private sector, but is not detrimental for growth in the state sector. We document significant differences in the corruption severity across 24 provinces in Vietnam that can be explained by the quality of provincial public governance (such as the costs of new business entry, land access, and private sector development policies). Our results suggest that improving the quality of local public governance can help to mitigate corruption and stimulate economic growth.

Keywords: Corruption, growth, governance, private firms, state-owned enterprises

JEL Classification: O10, H70, P37

Suggested Citation

Nguyen, Thuy Thu and Van Dijk, Mathijs A., Corruption, Growth, and Governance: Private vs. State-Owned Firms in Vietnam (May 4, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1600620 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1600620

Thuy Thu Nguyen

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management, Department of Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
0031 1048 2792 (Phone)

Business Administration Faculty, Foreign Trade University ( email )

91 Chua Lang
Dong Da District
Hanoi
Vietnam

Mathijs A. Van Dijk (Contact Author)

Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31 10 408 1124 (Phone)
+31 10 408 9017 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mathijsavandijk.com/

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
282
Abstract Views
1,376
rank
106,402
PlumX Metrics