The Second Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty: the Regressive Effect on Appealable Decisions

14 Pages Posted: 6 May 2010

See all articles by Uri Weiss

Uri Weiss

Polonsky Academy, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

Date Written: May 5, 2010

Abstract

This paper makes the point that a court decision which is open for appeal is actually equivalent to take it or leave it settlement proposal to both parties. In order that the case will not be appealed they both need to take this proposal. Hence, a right to appeal actually activates the regressive effects applicable on settlements also on the lower court decisions. Legal Uncertainty has a regressive effect on lower court decisions. If the judge wishes to block appeals in order to protect one party's interest or his self-interest or the system's interest, his decision will be regressive biased relatively to the higher court decision. This actually may be happened also without strategic judges, but in evolutionary process: the surviving power of regressive decision is bigger in uncertain legal regime.

Keywords: regressive effect, appeal, legal uncertainty, litigation, law and economis

JEL Classification: K

Suggested Citation

Weiss, Uri, The Second Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty: the Regressive Effect on Appealable Decisions (May 5, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1600817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1600817

Uri Weiss (Contact Author)

Polonsky Academy, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute ( email )

Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel

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