Citations (3)



What is Lying?

Don Fallis

University of Arizona

April 6, 2009

Journal of Philosophy, 106, 1, (2009): 29-56

In order to lie, you have to say something that you believe to be false. But this clearly is not sufficient for lying. Thus, philosophers have proposed several additional conditions (e.g., that a liar has to intend to deceive, or that a liar has to warrant the truth of what she says). I argue that none of the conditions that have been proposed so far are necessary for lying. I argue that lying is saying what you believe to be false when you believe that the following (Gricean) norm of conversation is in effect: "Do not say what you believe to be false."

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Lying, Definition, Philosophy, Grice

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Date posted: August 27, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Fallis, Don, What is Lying? (April 6, 2009). Journal of Philosophy, 106, 1, (2009): 29-56. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1601034

Contact Information

Don Fallis (Contact Author)
University of Arizona ( email )
1515 East First Street
Tucson, AZ 85719
United States
520-621-3565 (Phone)
520-621-3279 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sirls.arizona.edu/fallis
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