Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
39 Pages Posted: 8 May 2010 Last revised: 27 Sep 2010
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Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Date Written: May 8, 2010
Abstract
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this case, silence is telling and undermines the prevailing view over time if this view is incorrect. As a result, withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only a temporary phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts becomes large. For small groups, a simple mechanism the principal can use to improve decision-making is to appoint a devil's advocate.
Keywords: Experts, Committees, Career Concerns, Verifiable Information, Information Aggregation
JEL Classification: D71, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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