(Anti-) Coordination in Networks

33 Pages Posted: 12 May 2010

See all articles by Jaromir Kovarik

Jaromir Kovarik

Universidad de Alicante

Friederike Mengel

Maastricht University

J. Gabriel Romero-Ciavatto

University of the Balearic Islands - Departament d'Economia Aplicada

Date Written: May 10, 2010

Abstract

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Participants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are such that all links are coordinated. As a second treatment variation we let agents decide endogenously on the amount of information they would like to have and find that local (endogenous) information is equally efficient in ensuring successful coordination as full information. We provide an intuitive explanation of these facts which is supported by our data.

Keywords: Game Theory, Networks, Coordination Problems, Experiments

JEL Classification: C72, C90, C91, D85

Suggested Citation

Kovarik, Jaromir and Mengel, Friederike and Romero-Ciavatto, J. Gabriel, (Anti-) Coordination in Networks (May 10, 2010). FEEM Working Paper No. 49.2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1603822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1603822

Jaromir Kovarik

Universidad de Alicante ( email )

Campus de San Vicente
Carretera San Vicente del Raspeig
San Vicente del Raspeig, 03690
Spain

Friederike Mengel (Contact Author)

Maastricht University ( email )

Maastricht, Limburg

J. Gabriel Romero-Ciavatto

University of the Balearic Islands - Departament d'Economia Aplicada ( email )

Crta. de Valldemossa km 7,5
07122 Palma
Spain

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
100
Abstract Views
1,227
Rank
579,514
PlumX Metrics