Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

16 Pages Posted: 16 May 2010

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Maher Said

NYU Stern School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 13, 2010

Abstract

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.

Keywords: Dynamic auctions and mechanisms, Random arrivals and departures, Changing private information, Incentive compatibility

JEL Classification: C73, D43, D44, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Said, Maher, Dynamic Auctions: A Survey (May 13, 2010). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757R. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1606892 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1606892

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Maher Said

NYU Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mahersaid.com/

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