Endogenous Business Networks

Posted: 11 May 1999

See all articles by Raja Kali

Raja Kali

University of Arkansas - Department of Economics

Abstract

Business networks are a feature of the organizational landscape of many countries, though they vary in magnitude. This paper develops a theory of business networks where they are endogenous to the reliability of the legal system. Networks are a substitute for reliable institutional support that guarantees written contracts. The existence of networks exerts a negative effect on the functioning of the anonymous market. This is because the network absorbs honest individuals, raising the density of dishonest individuals engaged in anonymous market exchange. Since this lowers the payoff from market exchange, larger networks may be easier to enforce. We find that networks are economically inefficient unless they are relatively large. This is consistent with the view that informal contract enforcement institutions may be inefficient in general equilibrium even though they enhance efficiency in partial equilibrium.

JEL Classification: L14, 017, D23, P51

Suggested Citation

Kali, Raja, Endogenous Business Networks. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=160728

Raja Kali (Contact Author)

University of Arkansas - Department of Economics ( email )

Sam M. Walton College of Business
Fayetteville, AR 72701
United States
479-575-6219 (Phone)
479-575-3241 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://wcob.uark.edu/rkali/index.html

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,561
PlumX Metrics