Do High Technology Acquirers Become More Innovative?

45 Pages Posted: 15 May 2010

See all articles by Panos Desyllas

Panos Desyllas

University of Bath School of Management

Alan Hughes

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR)

Date Written: May 10, 2010

Abstract

Drawing on organisational, managerial and financial theories, we explore whether acquirers become more innovative and the factors that can enhance their absorptive and financial capacity to benefit from acquisition. Over a three year post-acquisition window, our sample of 2624 high technology US acquisitions records early reverses followed by positive R&D-intensity changes and insignificant R&D productivity changes. Controlling for acquisition endogeneity and deal-specific effects, significant acquirer characteristic effects emerge. In related acquisitions, a large knowledge base tends to increase R&D productivity, consistent with an enhanced capacity to select and absorb targets. In unrelated acquisitions, however, this relationship becomes increasingly negative as knowledge base concentration increases, consistent with arguments for an impaired peripheral vision and core rigidities. High leverage levels raise R&D productivity gains, consistent with enhanced monitoring induced efficiency. However, high leverage growth reduces R&D-intensity, consistent with increased financial constraints and short-termism.

Keywords: Acquisitions, Innovation, Propensity Score

Suggested Citation

Desyllas, Panos and Hughes, Alan, Do High Technology Acquirers Become More Innovative? (May 10, 2010). Research Policy, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1608087

Panos Desyllas (Contact Author)

University of Bath School of Management ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.desyllas.org

Alan Hughes

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )

Top Floor, Judge Business School Building
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
+44 1223 765335 (Phone)

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