The State as an Ecology of Political Enterprises

25 Pages Posted: 15 May 2010

See all articles by Giuseppe Eusepi

Giuseppe Eusepi

Sapienza University of Rome

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: May 15, 2010

Abstract

This paper seeks to overcome an antinomy within the theory of political economy: while market outcomes are treated as resulting from polycentric competition, political outcomes are treated as resulting from hierarchic planning. We seek to overcome this antinomy by treating political outcomes as likewise resulting from polycentric competition, taking due account of relevant institutional differences. For example, a parliamentary assembly is treated as a peculiar form of investment bank that intermediates between the sponsors of enterprises and those within the citizenry who have means to support those enterprises. What results is a theory in which political programs emerge in largely bottom-up fashion through complex networks of transactions. Much of the inspiration for this paper arises from the Italian School of Public Finance, particularly Ugo Mazzola, Giovanni Montemartine, Maffeo Pantaleoni, and, in more general terms, Antonio De Viti de Marco.

Keywords: Political Pricing, Political-Economic Interaction, Polycentric Politics, Economic Calculation, Emergence, Spontaneous Order, Order vs. Organization

JEL Classification: D2, D7, H1, H7

Suggested Citation

Eusepi, Giuseppe and Wagner, Richard E., The State as an Ecology of Political Enterprises (May 15, 2010). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 10-20, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1608252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1608252

Giuseppe Eusepi (Contact Author)

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

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Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rwagner/

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

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Arlington, VA 22201
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HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/richard-wagner

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