Maximum Effort in the Minimum-Effort Game

Posted: 17 May 2010

See all articles by Dirk Engelmann

Dirk Engelmann

University of London - Royal Holloway - Department of Economics

Hans-Theo Normann

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: May 3, 2010

Abstract

We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects.

Keywords: Minimum-effort game, Coordination game, Experiment, Social capital

JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92

Suggested Citation

Engelmann, Dirk and Normann, Hans-Theo, Maximum Effort in the Minimum-Effort Game (May 3, 2010). Experimental Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1609811

Dirk Engelmann (Contact Author)

University of London - Royal Holloway - Department of Economics ( email )

Egham, TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

Hans-Theo Normann

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics ( email )

Duesseldorf
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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