Retail Competition and Cooperative Advertising

Operations Research Letters, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 11-16

16 Pages Posted: 18 May 2010 Last revised: 4 Apr 2011

See all articles by Xiuli He

Xiuli He

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Anand Krishnamoorthy

University of Central Florida

Ashutosh Prasad

University of California, Riverside (UCR)

Suresh Sethi

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Date Written: May 17, 2010

Abstract

We consider a cooperative advertising channel consisting of a manufacturer selling its product through a retailer in competition with another independent retailer. The manufacturer subsidizes its retailer’s advertising only when a certain threshold is positive. Moreover, the manufacturer’s support for its retailer is higher under competition than in its absence.

Keywords: Differential games, Distribution channels, Cooperative advertising, Retail competition, Subsidy rate, Advertising, Retailing, Stackelberg game, Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, Nash-Stackelberg differential games

JEL Classification: C61, C7, C73, L13, M3

Suggested Citation

He, Xiuli and Krishnamoorthy, Anand and Prasad, Ashutosh and Sethi, Suresh, Retail Competition and Cooperative Advertising (May 17, 2010). Operations Research Letters, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 11-16, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1609854

Xiuli He

University of North Carolina at Charlotte ( email )

9201 University City Boulevard
Charlotte, NC 28223
United States

Anand Krishnamoorthy

University of Central Florida ( email )

College of Business Administration
4000 Central Florida Blvd.
Orlando, FL 32816-1400
United States

Ashutosh Prasad

University of California, Riverside (UCR)

900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA CA 92521
United States

Suresh Sethi (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

800 W. Campbell Road, SM30
Richardson, TX 75080-3021
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
183
Abstract Views
1,516
Rank
339,607
PlumX Metrics