The Predictability of Global Cartel Fines

Concurrences: Review of Competition Law, Vol. 2, 2010

14 Pages Posted: 19 May 2010  

Douglas J. Miller

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Economics

John M. Connor

Purdue University; American Antitrust Institute (AAI)

Date Written: May 4, 2010

Abstract

Legal opinion is divided on whether predicable sentences are a good thing for the administration of justice. In the case of cartel violations, both the United States and the EU have introduced guidelines for calculating fines that are intended to make fining decisions more transparent and to deter cartel formation. The research summarized in this paper finds that with one exception both jurisdictions follow the principles of optimal deterrence in a highly predictable fashion. However, actual fines on corporations guilty of global price fixing are only about one-third as high as optimal-deterrence theory dictates. We do find rather large differences in temporal patterns between U.S. and EC fines: the former do not increase from 1990 to 2008 whereas the latter increase dramatically. The Kroes commissionership and the second fining guidelines resulted in separate, substantial increases in global cartel fines.

Suggested Citation

Miller, Douglas J. and Connor, John M., The Predictability of Global Cartel Fines (May 4, 2010). Concurrences: Review of Competition Law, Vol. 2, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1610284

Douglas J. Miller

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Economics ( email )

118 Professional Building
Columbia, MO 65211
United States

John M. Connor (Contact Author)

Purdue University ( email )

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+1 317-733-1938 (Phone)

American Antitrust Institute (AAI)

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