The Independence of International Arbitrators and Judges: Tampered with or Well-Tempered?

New York International Law Review, Vol. 24, No 1, pp. 1-48, Winter 2011

48 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2012

Date Written: March 18, 2011

Abstract

Since the 18th century, international law has recognized the ancient principle that one cannot be a judge in one's own cause. As international tribunals grow in importance they are increasingly pushed toward legalization and institutionalization. This paper explores the relationship between the principle of judicial independence developed within the Western constitutional tradition and the evolving understandings concerning the impartiality and independence of international arbitrators and judges.

Keywords: Judicial Independence, Independence, Impartiality, Bias, Arbitrators, Arbitral Tribunals, Arbitral Independence, Challenge, Recusation, International Tribunal, Party Appointment, Party-Appointed Arbitrators

Suggested Citation

Gelinas, Fabien, The Independence of International Arbitrators and Judges: Tampered with or Well-Tempered? (March 18, 2011). New York International Law Review, Vol. 24, No 1, pp. 1-48, Winter 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1611233

Fabien Gelinas (Contact Author)

McGill University ( email )

3644 Peel Street
Montreal, Quebec H3A1W9
Canada

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