The Price Impact of Institutional Herding

46 Pages Posted: 19 May 2010

See all articles by Amil Dasgupta

Amil Dasgupta

London School of Economics (LSE); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Andrea Prat

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Michela Verardo

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2010

Abstract

In this paper we develop a simple theoretical model to analyze the impact of institutional herding on asset prices. A growing empirical literature has come to the intriguing conclusion that institutional herding positively predicts short-term returns but negatively predicts long-term returns. We offer a theoretical resolution to this dichotomy. In our model, career-concerned money managers interact with profit-motivated proprietary traders and security dealers endowed with market power. We show that the reputational concerns of fund managers imply an endogenous tendency to imitate past trades, which impacts the prices of the assets they trade. In our main result, we show that institutional herding positively predicts short-term returns but negatively predicts long-term returns. Our theory thus provides a simple and unified framework within which to interpret the empirical literature on the price impact of institutional herding. In addition, our paper generates several new testable predictions linking institutional herding behavior, trading volume, and the time-series properties of stock returns.

Keywords: career concerns, institutional herding, price impact

JEL Classification: C7, G0

Suggested Citation

Dasgupta, Amil and Prat, Andrea and Verardo, Michela, The Price Impact of Institutional Herding (May 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7804, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1611500

Amil Dasgupta (Contact Author)

London School of Economics (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 7458 (Phone)
+44 20 7955 7420 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Andrea Prat

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Michela Verardo

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Department of Finance
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/verardom/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
6
Abstract Views
1,150
PlumX Metrics