My Way: Strategic Preferences Vary by Negotiator Role and Regulatory Focus

23 Pages Posted: 19 May 2010

See all articles by Kirstin C. Appelt

Kirstin C. Appelt

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business; Columbia University

E. Tory Higgins

Columbia Business School - Management

Abstract

Negotiators may use vigilant, loss-minimizing strategies or eager, gain-maximizing strategies. The present study provides evidence that preferences for these different strategies depend on negotiator role and personal orientation. In a price negotiation, buyers and prevention-focused individuals prefer vigilant strategies whereas sellers and promotion-focused individuals prefer eager strategies. When there is a match between the strategy and the role (role-strategy fit) or between the strategy and the individual’s regulatory focus orientation (focus-strategy fit), the negotiator experiences more fit and plans to be more demanding in the negotiation. By manipulating strategy in a real, binding negotiation, we reveal its importance in determining negotiators’ subjective experiences and planned demand. Our results show that shared strategic preferences between different motivational orientations - negotiator role and personal regulatory focus - can create self-regulatory compatibility.

Suggested Citation

Appelt, Kirstin C. and Higgins, E. Tory, My Way: Strategic Preferences Vary by Negotiator Role and Regulatory Focus. IACM 23rd Annual Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1611815 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1611815

Kirstin C. Appelt (Contact Author)

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.kirstinappelt.com

E. Tory Higgins

Columbia Business School - Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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