Role of Status in Strategic Choices and Outcomes in Negotiations

5 Pages Posted: 21 May 2010

See all articles by Poonam Arora

Poonam Arora

Columbia University

Kirstin C. Appelt

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business; Columbia University

E. Tory Higgins

Columbia Business School - Management

Abstract

In negotiation settings, individuals’ perception of their position or status can strongly influence strategic choices and outcomes. Although some sources of status (such as race, gender, expertise, and power) have been studied in the context of negotiations, other subtler sources that are more ubiquitous and as strong (such as being part of a large corporation and having community support) have been overlooked. The two studies in this paper examine two situational determinants of status (the presence vs. absence of corporate backing, and the presence vs. absence of social support), and find that both sources increase participant perceptions of being in a strong position, result in the strategic adoption of a maximal goal focus, and in the second study, lead to better outcomes. A maximal goal focus, and not a positive expectancy, was the mechanism linking higher status to better-negotiated outcomes.

Suggested Citation

Arora, Poonam and Appelt, Kirstin C. and Higgins, E. Tory, Role of Status in Strategic Choices and Outcomes in Negotiations. IACM 23rd Annual Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1611817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1611817

Poonam Arora (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Kirstin C. Appelt

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.kirstinappelt.com

E. Tory Higgins

Columbia Business School - Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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