Pricing Strategies When and Why to Offer Shallow or Deep Discounts?

Posted: 22 May 2010 Last revised: 2 Mar 2021

See all articles by Manish Gangwar

Manish Gangwar

Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad

Nanda S. Kumar

University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Marketing

Date Written: May 20, 2010

Abstract

Empirical examination of the pricing policies of brands in several categories reveals that the pricing distribution is multi-modal with firms offering shallow and deep discounts with varying frequencies. Another interesting feature of these pricing distributions is that the modes are in the interior of the support. However, extant theory on price promotions predicts that the equilibrium pricing density will be bi-modal and the modes will be at the ends of the support of the distribution. In this study, we develop a dynamic game-theoretic model which allows for inter-temporal shifts in demand that may result from some consumers’ stockpiling at promotional prices. We examine how such behavior affects firms’ pricing strategy in a setting where firms and consumers interact repeatedly over an infinite horizon. The pricing distributions predicted by our theory are remarkably consistent with the pricing patterns observed in practice. The model allows us to generate many new and interesting insights on the optimal promotional strategies of firms and its interplay with the clientele mix, market structure and other market factors. Interestingly, we find that the stockpiling threshold is decreasing in the consumer’s willingness to stockpile. The model also highlights whether or not the stockpiling occurs in equilibrium depends on the market structure, mix of price sensitive, price insensitive and opportunistic consumers and discount rate.

Keywords: Promotional Strategies, Stockpiling, Endogenous Stockpiling Threshold, Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Game-Theory

Suggested Citation

Gangwar, Manish and Kumar, Nanda S., Pricing Strategies When and Why to Offer Shallow or Deep Discounts? (May 20, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1612092

Manish Gangwar (Contact Author)

Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad ( email )

Hyderabad, Gachibowli 500111
India

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.isb.edu/en/research-thought-leadership/faculty/pages/manish-gangwar.html

Nanda S. Kumar

University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Marketing ( email )

Dallas, TX
United States
972-883 6426 (Phone)
972-883 2799/972-883 6727 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.utdallas.edu/~nkumar

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