Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2011, Vol. 167, No. 1, pp. 126-142
17 Pages Posted: 20 May 2010 Last revised: 20 Nov 2012
Date Written: May 20, 2010
Scholarship on competition policy has begun to explore the implications of learning from behavioral research and to challenge the assumption of profit maximization at the heart of neoclassical economic theory of the firm. This scholarship is briefly reviewed, focusing on merger control. Prospects for basing merger control entirely on data from actual mergers or laboratory experiments are explored. Also explored are implications of behavioral research for merger assessment in consumer goods industries. The conclusion is that competition policy should continue to rely on neoclassical economic analysis based on the assumption of profit maximization.
Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Antitrust, Mergers
JEL Classification: K 21, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Werden, Gregory J. and Froeb, Luke and Shor, Mikhael, Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control (May 20, 2010). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2011, Vol. 167, No. 1, pp. 126-142; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1612282 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1612282