Who Writes the Bill? The Role of the Agenda-Setter in Legislative Lobbying
38 Pages Posted: 21 May 2010 Last revised: 5 Nov 2013
Date Written: December 5, 2012
We examine lobby influence on policy outcomes in a legislative vote-buying model with two competing lobbyists and endogenous policy proposals. We compare two polar cases: (1) the committee or (2) the lobbyist seeking policy change writes the bill. Surprisingly, we find that if salience is low, the committee proposes more extreme policy changes than the pro-change lobbyist even though the policy preferences of the committee are more moderate. The opposite is true if salience is high. We also show that the extreme proposals when salience is low do not necessarily involve lower welfare relative to the lobbyist's proposal.
Keywords: Legislative Lobbying, Vote Buying, Legislatures, Political Economy
JEL Classification: D72, P16
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation