Who Writes the Bill? The Role of the Agenda-Setter in Legislative Lobbying

38 Pages Posted: 21 May 2010 Last revised: 5 Nov 2013

Date Written: December 5, 2012

Abstract

We examine lobby influence on policy outcomes in a legislative vote-buying model with two competing lobbyists and endogenous policy proposals. We compare two polar cases: (1) the committee or (2) the lobbyist seeking policy change writes the bill. Surprisingly, we find that if salience is low, the committee proposes more extreme policy changes than the pro-change lobbyist even though the policy preferences of the committee are more moderate. The opposite is true if salience is high. We also show that the extreme proposals when salience is low do not necessarily involve lower welfare relative to the lobbyist's proposal.

Keywords: Legislative Lobbying, Vote Buying, Legislatures, Political Economy

JEL Classification: D72, P16

Suggested Citation

Schneider, Maik T., Who Writes the Bill? The Role of the Agenda-Setter in Legislative Lobbying (December 5, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1612812 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1612812

Maik T. Schneider (Contact Author)

University of Bath ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
68
Abstract Views
520
rank
341,978
PlumX Metrics