Expansion and Contraction in Monopolization Law

10 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2010  

Michal S. Gal

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law

Avishalom Tor

Notre Dame Law School; University of Haifa - Faculty of Law

Spencer Weber Waller

Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law - Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies

Date Written: May 25, 2010

Abstract

This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference on monopolization. It argues that monopolization law has been experiencing simultaneous expansion and contraction processes that are not wholly contradictory but at least partly complementary. Specifically, the authors suggest that the contraction of monopolization law in the United States and the EU might serve to facilitate its expansion and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach internationally also has made its refinement and rationalization all the more important for jurisdictions seeking to avoid the harmful chilling effects associated with excessive enforcement in this area. Finally, the contraction of monopolization law might also be motivated by external pressures, resulting from spillover effects. A better understanding and evaluation of these expansion and contraction trends is therefore likely to necessitate their joint rather than separate evaluation in future antitrust scholarship.

Keywords: Antitrust, Competition Law, Dominant Firm, Monopoly, Monopolization, Attempted Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, European Union, Multinational Firms, Multinational Corporations

JEL Classification: F12, F15, K21, l12, l40, l41

Suggested Citation

Gal, Michal S. and Tor, Avishalom and Waller, Spencer Weber, Expansion and Contraction in Monopolization Law (May 25, 2010). Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 76, No. 3, p. 653, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1615745

Michal S. Gal (Contact Author)

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Carmel
Haifa, 31905
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/en/faculty/gal/pages/home.aspx

Avishalom Tor

Notre Dame Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0780
United States

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Carmel
Haifa, IN IN 31905
Israel

Spencer Weber Waller

Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law - Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies ( email )

25 E. Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-915-7137 (Phone)
312-915-7201 (Fax)

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