30 Pages Posted: 27 May 2010 Last revised: 13 May 2014
Date Written: May 26, 2010
The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions.
Keywords: dynamic competition, static competition, optimal antitrust enforcement, optimal penalty
JEL Classification: K00, K31, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hylton, Keith N. and Lin, Haizhen, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions (May 26, 2010). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 10-15; Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 77, No. 1, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1616194
By Miriam Baer