Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions

30 Pages Posted: 27 May 2010 Last revised: 13 May 2014

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Haizhen Lin

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Date Written: May 26, 2010

Abstract

The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions.

Keywords: dynamic competition, static competition, optimal antitrust enforcement, optimal penalty

JEL Classification: K00, K31, K42

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N. and Lin, Haizhen, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions (May 26, 2010). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 10-15; Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 77, No. 1, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1616194

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

Haizhen Lin

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )

Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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