Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Employee Welfare and Collective Bargaining in Exposed and Protected Sectors: Evidence from Poland and Serbia

REC-WP Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe No. 04-2010

25 Pages Posted: 27 May 2010  

Magdalena Bernaciak

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Anil Duman

Central European University (CEU)

Vera Scepanovic

Central European University (CEU) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

Collective bargaining is closely related to social policy making to the extent that the outcomes of the former inform and influence social policy agenda. It is widely held, however, that trade unions in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) do not have a strong bargaining position and thus exert little impact on policy decisions. This paper challenges the view of CEE labour as a uniformly weak actor. It argues that CEE unions’ ability to shape the bargaining agenda and social policies depends largely on the degree of privatization, which overlaps with sectoral divisions. We find that unions in exposed sectors are unable to oppose greater flexibility even when there are no considerable wage gains, whereas workers in protected sectors manage to maintain their status and at times even enhance their welfare, both in terms of higher wages and better working conditions.

Keywords: Central-Eastern Europe, collective bargaining, trade unions, exposed and sheltered sectors, privatization

Suggested Citation

Bernaciak, Magdalena and Duman, Anil and Scepanovic, Vera, Employee Welfare and Collective Bargaining in Exposed and Protected Sectors: Evidence from Poland and Serbia (2010). REC-WP Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe No. 04-2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1616214 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1616214

Magdalena Bernaciak (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Anil Duman

Central European University (CEU) ( email )

Nador utca 9
Budapest, H-1051
Hungary

Vera Scepanovic

Central European University (CEU) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Nador utca 9
Budapest 1051
Hungary

Paper statistics

Downloads
92
Rank
237,213
Abstract Views
685