Dissertation Summary: The Imprisoner's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Proportionate Punishment

Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 181-184, 2008

4 Pages Posted: 28 May 2010

See all articles by Daniel Joseph D'Amico

Daniel Joseph D'Amico

Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt S.J. College of Business - Economics Department

Date Written: May 1, 2008

Abstract

As my title implies, I intend to treat the imprisoner - the central planner, the government itself - as no different from the traditional agents that economists so often analyze. I entertain the possibility that state authorities are no better informed or incentivized than the ordinary individuals within society, they are also tempted by the rewards of defection.

Keywords: Punishment, Knowledge, Incentives, Proportionality

Suggested Citation

D'Amico, Daniel Joseph, Dissertation Summary: The Imprisoner's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Proportionate Punishment (May 1, 2008). Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 181-184, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1616704

Daniel Joseph D'Amico (Contact Author)

Loyola University New Orleans - Joseph A. Butt S.J. College of Business - Economics Department ( email )

6363 St. Charles Ave
Box 015
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
561-870-5941 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.danieljdamico.com

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
48
Abstract Views
493
PlumX Metrics