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The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction

Ethan J. Leib

Fordham University School of Law

Michael Serota


Yale Law Journal Online, Vol. 120, 2010
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1616791

Finding methodological consensus for statutory interpretation cases is all the rage these days. Some in the academy sing the praises of a singular judicial approach to questions of statutory interpretation and bemoan the frustrations associated with judges implementing a mélange of interpretive techniques. And now, thanks to Abbe Gluck’s magisterial article, Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, proponents of interpretive uniformity have evidence that some state courts seem to be applying methodological stare decisis to decide questions of statutory interpretation. After exhaustive reading and analysis of state statutory interpretation cases – cases that have received far less attention than their federal counterparts – Gluck describes several important developments in state legisprudence that she thinks may have significant implications for the federal system.

This Essay proceeds in two Parts. First, we argue that dissensus provides significant benefits to our judicial system that not only merit our attention but justify the rejection of any form of methodological stare decisis requiring judges to follow fixed regimes that categorically ignore a statute’s etiology or the processes used to enact it. Second, we argue that there are serious costs to the kind of methodological stare decisis Gluck has explored, and that careful attention to the benefits of dissensus demonstrates that modified textualism is normatively unattractive after all.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: statutory interpretation, methodological consensus, rules v. standards, textualism, legal process

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Date posted: May 27, 2010 ; Last revised: August 5, 2010

Suggested Citation

Leib, Ethan J. and Serota, Michael, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction. Yale Law Journal Online, Vol. 120, 2010; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1616791. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1616791

Contact Information

Ethan J. Leib (Contact Author)
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
Michael Eli Serota
Independent ( email )
Feedback to SSRN

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