The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process
29 Pages Posted: 29 May 2010
Date Written: May 1, 2010
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to influence a public decision maker – and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task – with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.
Keywords: Illegal Lobbying, Endogenous Policy Making, Judicial Control
JEL Classification: H77, D72, D78, H11, D73, H49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures Theory and Evidence
By Richard Damania, Per G. Fredriksson, ...
-
By William Pyle
-
Bribes, Lobbying and Development
By Jakob Svensson and Bård Harstad
-
By Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro C. Vicente
-
Corruption and Political Competition
By Richard Damania and Erkan Yalçin
-
The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete-Contracts Approach
