The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process

29 Pages Posted: 29 May 2010

See all articles by Giuseppe Albanese

Giuseppe Albanese

Bank of Italy

Marco Maria Sorge

University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Date Written: May 1, 2010

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to influence a public decision maker – and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task – with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.

Keywords: Illegal Lobbying, Endogenous Policy Making, Judicial Control

JEL Classification: H77, D72, D78, H11, D73, H49

Suggested Citation

Albanese, Giuseppe and Sorge, Marco Maria, The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process (May 1, 2010). MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2010/23, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1617196 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1617196

Giuseppe Albanese (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

Marco Maria Sorge

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

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