The Influence of Heterogenous Bargaining Strengths on Optimal Wage Negotitations

24 Pages Posted: 30 May 2010

See all articles by Anna Goeddeke

Anna Goeddeke

Reutlingen University - ESB Business School

Date Written: May 29, 2010

Abstract

In this paper I show that - in contrast to the findings in the previous literature - substitutable workers can be better off negotiating in separate unions and complementary workers in one encompassing union. In addition, I find that results do not differ if two craft unions merge and negotiate as one bargaining agent or whether two separate craft unions negotiate with firms in one negotiation.

Keywords: Wage Negotiations, Heterogeneous Workers, Bargaining Strength

JEL Classification: D43, J50, L13

Suggested Citation

Goeddeke, Anna, The Influence of Heterogenous Bargaining Strengths on Optimal Wage Negotitations (May 29, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1617642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1617642

Anna Goeddeke (Contact Author)

Reutlingen University - ESB Business School ( email )

Alteburgstr. 150
Reutlingen, 72762
Germany

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