Dual Agency Representation: Incentive Conflicts or Efficiencies?

37 Pages Posted: 30 May 2010

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 29, 2010

Abstract

This study examines potential incentive misalignments and informational efficiencies associated with dual agency and the degree to which those effects vary over a listing contract. The analysis generates hypotheses about timing of dual agency and its impact on selling price. Probit estimates indicate that dual agency is more likely to occur at the beginning and end of a listing contract. In both periods dual agency transactions result in lower prices than sales in which different agents or firms represent the seller and buyer. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that dual agency given these situations may be the result of incentive misalignments.

Keywords: Dual Agency, Principal Agent

Suggested Citation

Brastow, Raymond T. and Waller, Bennie D., Dual Agency Representation: Incentive Conflicts or Efficiencies? (May 29, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1617715 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1617715

Raymond T. Brastow

Longwood College ( email )

School of Business and Economics
Farmville, VA
United States
804-395-2370 (Phone)
804-395-2203 (Fax)

Bennie D. Waller (Contact Author)

Longwood University ( email )

201 High Street
Farmville, VA 23909
United States
434-395-2046 (Phone)
434-395-2203 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.benniewaller.com

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