Performance-Based Fees and Moral Hazard: Aligning the Interests of Investors and Managers

8 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2010

Date Written: Spring 2010

Abstract

In an ideal world, the financial interests of asset managers would be perfectly aligned with those of their investors via optimal incentive contracts. In the real world, this is often not the case. It is worthwhile investigating how to improve the current situation. In the theory of delegated management the optimal incentive fee is often linear, under stringent assumptions. In practice we see that a lot of the incentive contracts are convex rather than linear, with option characteristics. This typically introduces moral hazard on the side of the manager. This article examines a number of fee contracts in practice. We propose several improvements on the standard convex fee contracts to better align them with the interests of investors. The key is to make actual fee arrangements more linear.

Keywords: Alignment, Delegated Management, Moral Hazard, Pension Fund, Performance Fee, Principal-Agent

Suggested Citation

Molenkamp, Jan Bertus, Performance-Based Fees and Moral Hazard: Aligning the Interests of Investors and Managers (Spring 2010). Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1618837 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1618837

Jan Bertus Molenkamp (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
436
Abstract Views
2,571
Rank
101,453
PlumX Metrics