Norms in Sports Contests: The Tour De France

Journal of Sport Management 26(1): 43-52, 2012

31 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2010 Last revised: 15 Apr 2012

Alexander Fink

University of Leipzig

Daniel J. Smith

Middle Tennessee State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: June 3, 2010

Abstract

Profit-maximizing organizers of sports contests have an incentive to implement rules that increase the attractiveness of sports contest for spectators. But prohibitively high enforcement costs can prevent organizers from implementing certain rules. We argue that in these instances unofficial norms can potentially complement the official rules and add to the attractiveness of a contest. If contest participants face low enough monitoring and sanctioning costs, they can enforce unofficial norms among themselves. We provide evidence in support of our contention from the Tour de France.

Keywords: contest theory, sports contests, norms, Tour de France, rules

JEL Classification: L83, D02, D23

Suggested Citation

Fink, Alexander and Smith, Daniel J., Norms in Sports Contests: The Tour De France (June 3, 2010). Journal of Sport Management 26(1): 43-52, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1619933

Alexander Fink

University of Leipzig ( email )

Grimmaische Str. 12
Leipzig, 04109

HOME PAGE: http://www.alexander-fink.com

Daniel J. Smith (Contact Author)

Middle Tennessee State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

MTSU Box 27
1301 E. Main St.
Murfreesboro, TN 37132-0001
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.danieljosephsmith.com/

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