Start-Up Incentives: Entrepreneurship Policy or Active Labour Market Programme?

38 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2010

See all articles by Concepción Román

Concepción Román

University of Huelva

Emilio Congregado

University of Huelva

José María Millán

University of Huelva

Date Written: June 3, 2010

Abstract

This paper investigates the determinants of the transitions from unemployment to paid employment, own-account work, and employership in Europe, with special focus on the role of some macroeconomic variables. Our results suggest that the coexistence of recession periods, start-up incentives, and strict employment protection may be distorting the occupational choice against true entrepreneurs and favour certain forms of self-employment - such as last resort or dependent. Therefore, public expenditure designed to move the unemployed back to employment might be detrimental to employment rights and the social protection of workers by favouring atypical forms of employment outside the scope of labour laws.

Keywords: true entrepreneurs, last resort self-employment, unemployment, start-up incentives, business cycle, employment protection, Europe

JEL Classification: J24, J64, J68, K31, L26, M13

Suggested Citation

Román, Concepción and Congregado, Emilio and Millan, Jose Maria, Start-Up Incentives: Entrepreneurship Policy or Active Labour Market Programme? (June 3, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1619990 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1619990

Concepción Román (Contact Author)

University of Huelva ( email )

Plaza de la Merced 11
Huelva, Huelva 21071
Spain
+34959217886 (Phone)

Emilio Congregado

University of Huelva ( email )

Departament of Economics
Plaza de la Merced, 11
Huelva, Huelva 21002
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.uhu.es/emilio.congregado

Jose Maria Millan

University of Huelva ( email )

Plaza de la Merced 11
Huelva, Huelva 21071
Spain
+34959217886 (Phone)

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