52 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2010 Last revised: 3 Nov 2012
Date Written: October 16, 2010
We show that country characteristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence. In contrast, country characteristics have little explanatory power for the fraction of outside bank directors with experience in the banking industry. Exploiting the time-series dimension of the sample, we show that changes in bank characteristics are not robustly associated with changes in board independence, while changes in board experience are positively related to changes in bank size and negatively related to changes in performance. The evidence suggests that country-specific laws and regulations affect the composition of boards of banks mainly through requirements for director independence.
Keywords: Boards, Directors, Bank Governance
JEL Classification: G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ferreira, Daniel and Kirchmaier, Tom and Metzger, Daniel, Boards of Banks (October 16, 2010). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 289/2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1620551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1620551