International Organization, Vol. 65, p. 673, Fall 2011
35 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2010 Last revised: 20 Feb 2015
Date Written: August 19, 2011
Several prominent human rights treaties attempt to minimize violations during emergencies by authorizing states to “derogate” - that is, to suspend certain civil and political liberties - in response to crises. The drafters of these treaties envisioned that international restrictions on derogations and international notification and monitoring mechanisms would limit rights suspensions during emergencies. This article analyzes the behavior of derogating countries using new global datasets of derogations and states of emergency from 1976 to 2007. We argue that derogations are a rational response to domestic political uncertainty. They enable governments facing serious threats to buy time and legal breathing space from voters, courts, and interest groups to confront crises while signaling to these audiences that rights deviations are temporary and lawful. Our findings have implications for the studies of treaty design and flexibility mechanisms and compliance with international human rights agreements.
Keywords: International Law, Human Rights, Treaties, Flexibility, Derogation, Compliance, Emergencies, Crises, ICCPR
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie and Helfer, Laurence R. and Fariss, Christopher J., Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogation from Human Rights Treaties (August 19, 2011). International Organization, Vol. 65, p. 673, Fall 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1622732