The Regulation of Pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands: In the Public or Private Interest?

Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 155-201, 2002

Posted: 10 Jun 2010 Last revised: 18 Jun 2010

See all articles by Niels J. Philipsen

Niels J. Philipsen

Maastricht University - Faculty of Law, Metro

Michael G. Faure

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Date Written: 2002

Abstract

The regulation of pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands is analysed in order to test the rent-seeking hypothesis put forward in the private interest literature. Both the self-regulation issued by the professional bodies and public regulations are examined. It appears that many regulations in both countries either restrict the entry into the profession or restrict competition within the profession. A qualitative comparative analysis of these regulations in both countries is presented as well as some empirical findings. The economic analysis and the empirical data seem to give some support to the rent-seeking hypothesis.

Keywords: pharmacists, competition, establishment policy, conduct regulation, self-regulation, performance

JEL Classification: K23, K32, L44, L51

Suggested Citation

Philipsen, N. J. and Faure, Michael G., The Regulation of Pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands: In the Public or Private Interest? (2002). Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 155-201, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1623326

N. J. Philipsen (Contact Author)

Maastricht University - Faculty of Law, Metro ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200MD
Netherlands
+31 43 388 3256 (Phone)
+31 43 325 9091 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/show/id=116435/langid=43

Michael G. Faure

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro ( email )

PO Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31 - 43 - 388 30 60 (Phone)
+31 - 43 - 325 90 91 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.michaelfaure.be

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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